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The perils of collective begging:  





This article explores the consequences of “collective begging”, that is the failure to provide 
meaningful legal protection and support for collective bargaining. The first part identifies the 
perils we are now facing, including increasing precarious work, growing economic inequality 
and diminished democratic engagement. The second part considers our journey here, namely 
how we took our (collective) eye off the ball and enabled “begging” rather than “bargaining”. 
Finally, the third part considers potential legal solutions, including expanding the coverage of 
those at work legally entitled to trade union representation, facilitating sectoral bargaining 
and enlarging the scope for lawful industrial action.  
 
 
There is a saying that, in the absence of effective collective bargaining including recourse to 
strike action, workers’ organisations engage merely in “collective begging”. The origins of this 
term have been traced back, by Eric Tucker, to 1921.1 It is now evident that there are certain 
dangers that arise if we are resigned to “collective begging”. These are not mere projections 
for the “future of work” but are readily identifiable now in the global economy and labour 
markets across the world.  
 
The first part of this article seeks to identify the perils we are now facing, which can be 
characterised by the normalisation of increasing precarious work, growing economic inequality 
and diminished democratic engagement. The second part considers our journey here, namely 
how we took our (collective) eye off the ball and enabled “begging” rather than “bargaining”. 
This analysis deserves more than the short analysis that can be offered in this article, but my 
 
* University of Bristol School of Law and Centre for Law at Work, tonia.novitz@bristol.ac.uk. This article is an 
adaptation of a keynote address delivered at the New Zealand Labour Law Society conference hosted at Victoria 
University of Wellington in November 2019. I am grateful to the organisers and participants for comments; all 
errors are my own. 
1 Eric Tucker “Can Worker Voice Strike Back? Law and the Decline and Uncertain Future of Strikes” in Alan 
Bogg and Tonia Novitz (eds) Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the Common Law World (Oxford 




focus will be on tensions between social and economic forces at both national and international 
levels and how they have manifested in labour law regulation.  
 
Finally, the third part considers potential solutions, identifying a set of prescriptions advocated 
across the globe, on which labour lawyers broadly agree. These include enlarging the coverage 
of those legally entitled to trade union representation at work and enhancing access to that 
representation. Enhancing bargaining rather than “begging” can be fostered by greater 
solidarity, such that there is a powerful argument for facilitating sectoral bargaining within any 
given state and indeed for enabling industrial action to be taken in solidarity across enterprises 
and even national borders. Local strength of feeling also matters and is indeed vital to giving 
collective worker voice meaning. We need the space within national and international labour 
laws, as well as institutional provision by extant trade unions, to enable emergent voices to be 
heard on the matters that concern them. This may also entail not just preserving legal protection 
of a right to strike, but enhancing its scope and the compass of its legitimate objectives.  
 
The consensus emerging on the need for such reforms should not be so surprising. There are 
profound shared global links between industrial labour law systems. Countries are not 
independent in the ways that they once were but linked through a network of trade, investment, 
subcontracting supply/value (or “poverty”) chains and corporate interlinkages (whether 
through subsidiaries or franchising).2 Workplaces, by way of contrast, are artificially separated 
or “fissured”, despite the contractual and corporate links between the employers at each site.3 
Their implementation will, of course, have to be sensitive to the dynamics of each domestic 
industrial relations system, which is embedded into the political culture of any given country.4 
In this sense, the local will always need to be respected in the crafting of change. Additionally, 
while we might sensibly look to international institutions like the International Labour 
 
2 Charlotte Villiers “Collective Responsibility and the Limits of Disclosure in Regulating Global Supply 
Chains” (2018) 23 Deakin LR 143, citing  Benjamin Selwyn “Global Value Chains or Global Poverty Chains? 
A New Research Agenda” (June 2016) Working Paper No 10, Centre for Global Political Economy, University 
of Sussex <www.sussex.ac.uk> at 2. See also Benjamin Selwyn “Social Upgrading and Labour in Global 
Production Networks: A Critique and an Alternative Conception” (2013) 17 Competition and Change 75. 
3 David Weil The Fissured Workplace: Why work became so bad for so many and what can be done to improve 
it (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 2014). 
4 Otto Kahn-Freund “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law” (1974) 37 MLR 1, 26; although note the 
identification of greater possibilities for transnational transplantation of collective labour representation by 
Manfred Weiss “The Future of Comparative Labor Law as an Academic Discipline and as a Practical Tool” 
(2003) 25 Comp Lab L & Poly J 169 at 170 and 179–80; and Katherine Stone “A New Labor Law for a New 
World of Work: The Case for a Comparative-Transnational Approach” (2007) 28 Comp Lab L & Poly J 565 at 





Organization (ILO) for guidance, it remains possible for any country to be proactive in the 
promotion of the reforms proposed here, so as to evade the current perils of “collective 
begging”.  
 
I What Perils are we Facing?  
 
In recent years, policy-makers have spent so much time thinking about and speculating on the 
more distant “future of work” (and the associated dangers of human replacement by artificial 
intelligence and robotics),5 it is almost as if we have forgotten the perils facing us at the present 
time. We can and should focus on what is happening now in 2020, following the decline of 
collective bargaining. It is argued here that key trends include: the normalisation of precarity 
at work, increased inequalities in income and diminished democratic engagement. In the 
absence of some corrective, these trends will only continue. 
 
A Precarious work 
 
As Judy Fudge and Deirdre McCann have observed, precarious work takes a myriad of forms 
and is multidimensional. They have analysed this emergent phenomenon in relation to the 
International Labour Organization’s conception of “unacceptable forms of work”.6 However, 
the interest here is rather in how precarity has become regarded as acceptable and has been 
normalised.7  
 
Arguably, what is indicative of precarious work (drawing on a variety of literature)8 is either 
the absence of - or uncertainty relating to: 
(1)  ongoing employment;  
(2)  income levels;  
(3)  entitlement to work; 
 
5 International Labour Organization (ILO) Global Commission on the Future of Work Work for a Brighter 
Future (22 January 2019) <www.ilo.org>; and see Report of the Director General: ILO Future of Work 
Centenary Initiative ILC 104th session (ILO, Geneva, 2015) <www.ilo.org>.  
6 Deirdre McCann and Judy Fudge “Unacceptable Forms of Work: A Multidimensional Model” (2017) 156 Intl 
Lab Rev 147.  
7 David Mangan “Deepening Precarity in the United Kingdom” in Jeff Kenner, Isabella Florczak and Marta Otto 
(eds) Precarious Work. The Challenge for Labour Law in Europe (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2019). 
8 Nicola Kountouris “The Legal Determinants of Precariousness in Personal Work Relations: A European 




(4)  scope for dignity at work (including being subjected to discriminatory conduct); and  
(4)  coverage by established individual and collective statutory employment and labour law 
protections which would secure such social goods as, for example, health and safety 
protections and collective bargaining.  
 
These various aspects of precarity are widely recognised as having become increasingly 
prevalent as trade union representation has declined.9  
 
These marks of precarity are present in standard forms of employment in the contemporary 
labour market, as well as newer modes of hire. So-called “ordinary jobs”, which have always 
been and are still characterised in terms of a “standard employment relationship”,10  have 
themselves changed. They are now often shorter term, low-waged, performance-managed, and 
made subject to surveillance and unreasonable targets.11  
 
Then there are jobs in what has been termed a “grey area” or “grey zone”. 12  Are they 
“employees” or “workers”, or is this even really work and not some one’s own business? It can 
be observed readily that what has been termed “non-standard work” has increased. Many forms 
of work come within this categorisation and they are all very different. They can be fixed-term 
contracts, supply through a temporary work agency, zero hours or, more frequently, set 
minimum but uncertain hours.13 Security of employment is often an issue here less de facto 
and more de jure. Such a situation is now frequent in what were professionalised sectors, such 
as United Kingdom universities, where it is estimated that approximately half the academic 
teaching staff are on casualised contracts (fixed-term and often hourly paid).14  
 
 
9 See, for example, the correlation discussed by Maarten Keune “Trade Unions, Precarious Work and 
Dualisation in Europe” in Werner Eichhorst and Paul Marx (eds) Non-Standard Employment in Post-Industrial 
Labour Markets: An Occupational Perspective (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2015). 
10 As, for example, described in ILO R198 Employment Relationship Recommendation 2006 . 
11 Arne L Kalleberg and Peter V Marsden “Transformation of the Employment Relationship” in Emerging 
Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An interdisciplinary, searchable, and linkable resource (Wiley, 
Hoboken (NJ), 2015); and Eurofound Future of Manufacturing – New Tasks in Old Jobs: Drivers of change and 
implications for job quality (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018). 
12 See Matthew Taylor Good Work; The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices (Gov.uk, 2017); and 
OECD Policy Responses to New Forms of Work (OECD Publishing, 2019). 
13 See, in the UK, the practices of the chain, Sports Direct, discussed in UK Business, Innovation and Skills  
Committee Employment Practices at Sports Direct (19 July 2016). 
14 See survey evidence outlined in University and College Union Counting the Costs of Casualisation in higher 




So-called “gig work” is also rife, entailing quasi-entrepreneurial hire of labour, which entails 
the worker logging in to an “app” to provide human services on demand.15 Often the price of 
those services is set in advance by the app provider, payment is made via the app, and the 
performance of services regulated by feedback transformed into an algorithm which determines 
ratings and also (whether directly or indirectly) further availability of work.16 This mode of 
accessing paid work (with its accompanying high control-low cost model) has become common 
in transport, food delivery, cleaning services and care work, not only in the United States, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, but also in Africa and 
Asia.17 It is often (although not invariably) characterised by cross-border contractual chains 
and franchises,18  with international arbitration as remedial recourse, rather than access to 
domestic tribunals and courts.19 Also increasing exponentially is online crowd-work, entailing 
competition for short-term contracts.20 There are concerns that this type of work has indirectly 
discriminatory effects on women,21 and can also be linked to age discrimination.22 Notably, 
trade unions in all places and of various sizes and stages of establishment have made efforts to 
represent workers in the gig economy,23 but some courts have been resistant to enabling them 




15 Jeremias Prassl Humans as a Service: The promise and Perils of Work in the Gig Economy (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2018).  
16 Valerio De Stefano “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time Workforce’: On-Demand Work, Crowd Work and Labour 
Protection in the ‘Gig-Economy’” (2016) 37 Comp Lab L & Poly J 471. 
17 Mark Graham, Isis Hjorth, and Vili Lehdonvirta “Digital Labour and Development: Impacts of global digital 
labour platforms and the gig economy on worker livelihoods” (2017) 23(2) Transfer: European Review of 
Labour and Research 135. 
18 For the Uber model, see Elizabeth and Mark Abell “Uber – A Fare Deal for Franchisees” (2016) 14 Int JFL 
45; and, for arguments regarding franchise regulation, Martin Malin “Protecting Platform Workers in the Gig 
Economy: Look to the FTC” (2018) 51 Ind Law Rev 377. 
19 See Miriam A Cherry Regulatory Options for Conflicts of Law and Jurisdictional Issues in the On-demand 
Economy (8 July 2019) ILO Conditions of Work and Employment Series Working Paper No 106 <www.ilo.org> 
at 1 – 4 and 24–25; and Charlotte Garden, “Disrupting Work Law: Arbitration in the Gig Economy” (2017) U 
Chi Legal F 205.  
20 See Debra Howcroft and Birgitta Bergvall-Kåreborn “A Typology of Crowdwork Platforms” (2019) 33(1) 
Work, Employment and Society 21. 
21 Miriam Kullmann “Platform Work, Algorithmic Decision-making, and EU Gender Equality Law” (2018) 
34(1) IJCCLIR 1. 
22 Miriam A Cherry, “Age Discrimination in the on-Demand Economy and Crowdwork” (2019) 40 Berkeley J 
Emp & Lab L 29. 
23 Valerio De Stefano “Non-standard Work and Limits on Freedom of Association: A human rights-based 
approach” (2016) 46(2) ILJ 185. 
24 See the Independent Workers' Union of Great Britain (IWGB) v RooFoods Ltd (t/a Deliveroo) CAC decision 
[2018] IRLR 84 and the unsuccessful judicial review: R (on the application of IWGB) v CAC [2018] EWHC 
3342 (Admin), [2019] IRLR 249. Discussed in Michael Ford and Tonia Novitz “Error! Main Document 
Only.There is Power in a Union? Revisiting Trade Union Functions in 2019” in Alan Bogg, Jacob Rowbottom 




Gig work is just one limb of a wider technological obsession in “future of work” debates. 
Linked to this development is the potential technological threat to the existence of work as we 
know it, although threats of redundancy are possibly overstated.25 Arguably, the issue that is 
not being addressed is where the wealth generated by technology goes? To what extent does it 
benefit the society in which it is developed or the workers who design and use it? Without 
access to collective bargaining, the redistribution of profits from technological advancement 
seems unlikely. 
 
Migrant work can also be precarious work. There is substantial evidence that long term 
migrants suffer systemic discrimination in terms of both access to jobs and treatment when in 
work.26 Temporary migrant workers (often hired by temporary work agencies) form part of 
exploitative global labour chains. The terms of their hire may be subject to debt bondage,27 or 
other significant sanctions for leaving.28  They can be housed in isolated conditions, paid 
systematically less than local host state workers, and work without standard health and safety 
protections. At worst, control of temporary migrant workers is militarised – for which, see the 
use of guns against Bangladeshi strawberry pickers in Greece29 – but also often control can be 
achieved simply through reminders of the insecurity of their immigration status.30 There is 
genuine difficulty involved in organising migrant workers, whether by unions in the home or 
host states, although there have been some useful and positive experiments.31 Without legal 
facilitation of collective bargaining, competition to access jobs emerges. The migrant is blamed 
 
25 ILO Inception Report for the Global Commission on the Future of Work (2017) at 25 <www.ilo.org>. 
Different projections in that report varied from a risk to over 56 per cent of jobs (in ASEAN coming from an 
ILO study) to two-thirds of all jobs in developing countries. Estimates are more conservative from 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers regarding jobs in the UK and Germany (30 per cent and 35 per cent of jobs 
respectively to go) with, at the opposite extreme, Roland Berger’s view that the loss in industrial jobs will be 
more than compensated by a rise in jobs in services.  
26 Steve Jefferys “The Context to Challenging Discrimination against Ethnic Minorities and Migrant Workers at 
Work” (2015) 21(1) Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 9. 
27 Jennifer Gordon “Regulating the Human Supply Chain” (2017) 102 Iowa L Rev 445; Rutvica Andrijasevic 
and Devi Sacchetto “‘Disappearing workers’”: Foxconn in Europe and the changing role of temporary work 
agencies” (2017) 31(1) Work, Employment and Society 54. 
28 Rutvica Andrijasevic and Tonia Novitz “Supply Chains and Unfree Labor: Regulatory failure in the case of 
Samsung Electronics in Slovakia” (2020) Journal of Human Trafficking, forthcoming.  
29 Application No. 21884/15 Chowdury v Greece ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0330JUD002188415. 
30 Judy Fudge “Illegal Working, Migrants and Labour Exploitation in the UK” (2018) 38(3) OJLS 557; and 
Bridget Anderson, “Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious Workers” (2010) 24(2) 
Work, Employment and Society 300. 
31 Magdalena Bernaciek “Polish Trade Unions and Social Dumping Debates: Between a rock and a hard place”. 
(2016) 22(4) Transfer 505–519; and Rebecca Zahn New Labour Laws in Old Member States: Trade Union 




and not the employer. The slogans of “British jobs for British workers” and “America First” 
are palpable reminders of the dangers here.32  
  
Indeed, the overarching effect of the trend towards precarity outlined above is vulnerability of 
workers and potential competition between them, as opposed to solidarity which might secure 
improved terms and conditions. Moreover, as access to work becomes ever more uncertain, 
terms and conditions including the income of those at work can decline.  
 
B Increasing economic inequality 
 
Another facet of precarity and vulnerability in the modern labour market is determination of 
remuneration by reference to minimum standards (a statutory national minimum or, in the 
United Kingdom, ironically called a “living wage”),33 rather than collectively bargained pay 
that ensures a share of profits. This has led to a significant increase in the disparity of income 
levels between the wealthy and the poor, but also between capital, managers and those 
dependent on working for a living.34 In the United Kingdom, for example, work can no longer 
be relied on to provide a living wage. A Joseph Rowntree Report published in 2013 found, for 
the first time, that a majority of families in poverty are also families in work.35 In other words, 
being employed does not prevent destitution or severe economic hardship. Since the financial 
crisis, the social consequences of low wages include a doubling in the number of workers who 
need housing benefit and growing reliance on foodbanks.36  
 
There is a strong empirical link drawn here to the decline in trade union density, discussed by 
economists at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Florence Buitron and Carolina Osario.37 
The motivation for interest from the IMF would seem to be, not only the protection of workers 
as human beings, but that growing inequalities of income also affect consumer potential and, 
 
32 Tonia Novitz “ Freedom of Association: Its emergence and the case for prevention of its decline”  in Janice 
Bellace and Beryl ter Haar (eds) Research Handbook on Labour, Business and Human Rights Law (Research 
Handbooks in Human Rights, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2019) 231–252. 
33 See in the UK, “National Minimum Wage Rates” GOV.UK <www.gov.uk>. 
34 Thomas Piketty Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 2014). 
35 T MacInnes and others Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion (Joseph Rowntree Foundation and New 
Policy Institute, York, 2013) at 26. Confirmed again at 55 per cent in 2016, see <www.jrf.org.uk>. 
36 National Housing Federation Home Truths:The Housing Market in England 2013/2014 (National Housing 
Federation, London, 2014). 
37 Florence Jaumotte and Carolina Buitron Inequality and Labor Market Institutions (IMF Staff Discussion Note 




ironically, undermine capitalism as a whole. This is also arguably part of the fear inherent in 
World Bank and OECD Reports on The Changing World of Work and New Forms of Work 
(respectively). They are seeking to rebuild the idea of productive work which does not only 
enable profitability but also some disposable income on the part of the worker.38  
 
C The quality of democratic engagement 
 
Finally, precarious work and inequalities of income arguably do not only have implications for 
the consumer base in global capitalism, but also for the quality of democratic engagement.39 
Precarity limits the scope to find energy for political activity and campaigning, which are 
becoming again a preserve of the elite. As capital gains in wealth, employers become ever more 
influential in political life.  
 
Powerful vested interests can hijack political advertising, not just through conventional media 
(as was the case with the Rupert Murdoch press in the 1980s and 1990s which had to be wooed 
by political leaders), but through less tangible forms of communication (for example, the 
Google and Facebook scandals).40 This may also be linked to the attempt to blame other even 
more vulnerable workers for the conditions experienced in the workplace, rather than the 
employers prepared to exploit them.41 
  
Workers’ collective political organisation is under pressure in part due to lack of resources. As 
Keith Ewing predicted back in 1988, “[i]f the unions continue to decline in an unfriendly 
economic and legal environment, the income base of the Labour Party will also continue to 
decline”.42 Union dues have had to remain minimal in low income occupations and it can be 
difficult to unionise newer forms of work. There are also substantial controls in the United 
 
38 World Bank World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work [World Development Report 
2019] (24 April 2019) World Bank Group <openknowledge.worldbank.org>; and OECD, above n 12.  
39 Buitron and Osario, above n 37, observe at 27 that: “Inequality could also hurt society by allowing top earners 
to manipulate the economic and political system.” 
40 Daniel Kreiss and Shannon C McGregor “Technology Firms Shape Political Communication: The work of 
Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and Google with campaigns during the 2016 US presidential cycle” (2018) 35(2) 
Political Communication 155–177; and Carole Cadwalladr and Emma Graham-Harrison “Revealed: 50 million 
Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach” The Guardian (online ed, London, 
17 March 2018). 
41 See Fudge, above n 30 above.  




Kingdom of unions’ use of political funds.43 In the United Kingdom, where elections are 
privately funded, there is less counterweight than there was to donations from the wealthy. The 
impacts are self-reinforcing. Precarity and diminishing worker income leads to a lack of 
democratic engagement, which diminishes active worker representation in government, and 
then has flow on effects for the regulation of collective bargaining.44  
 
II The Journey to Collective Begging 
 
The obvious question is: how did we get here? One commonly identified culprit (and a 
convenient one) is “technology”.45 However, it seems curious that mere technology, without 
human intervention, can bring about such widespread extensive outcomes. Employers have 
long sought to blame technology for how they seek to effect change in the workplace (from the 
Luddites onwards). 46  While new technologies have potentially enhanced employer profit, 
workers and their organisations have responded by bargaining over what the impact of 
technology should be on them and how profits should be distributed.  
 
My suggestion is that it may be more sensible to attribute the current state of affairs, the perils 
we face in the world of work, to a prevalent belief in two myths. The first is the myth of efficacy 
of market operations, namely that the labour market can and will self-regulate. This fiction 
ignores the ways in which markets are created, structured and changed by various legal remits. 
The second is the fiction of individual choice in the labour market. In other words, anyone at 
work chooses his or her fate, in a consensual contractual relationship with an “employer”. 
These myths can be linked to the motivations for introduction of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 and the deregulatory Thatcherite policies in the United Kingdom of the 1980s and 
1990s.47 They have been prompts for the removal or marginalisation of legal protection of 
collective bargaining.  
 
43 See the discussion in Michael Ford and Tonia Novitz “Legislating for Control: The Trade Union Act 2016” 
(2016) 45(3) ILJ 277, at 283 and 289–290. 
44 As discussed in an updated analysis in Keith Ewing “The Unfinished Paper – A Tribute to Gordon Anderson” 
(2019) 50(2) VUWLR 173 at 174–5 and 184.  
45 For example, World Bank Development Report 2019, above n 38, at 19: “technology is disrupting the demand 
for skills … technology has the potential to improve living standards … technology may prevent Africa and 
South Asia from industrializing in a manner that moves workers to the formal sector”.  
46 See EP Thompson “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism” (1967) 38 Past and Present 56. 
47 For analysis of the currency of these beliefs and the need for a riposte in the terms of economic theory and 
practice, see Simon Deakin “Thirty Years On: Labour Market Deregulation and its Aftermath in New Zealand 





Polanyi’s book, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 
sought to understand the relationship between market and social forces.48 Polanyi identified 
“fictitious commodities”: land, labour and money, which were not “produced for sale” like 
other commodities. Labour, for example, is a human activity which cannot neatly be detached 
from the rest of life or be “stored”. 49  That feature made, in Polanyi’s eyes, labour an 
inappropriate subject for exposure to fluctuating market value:50 
 
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings 
and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing 
power, would result in the demolition of society. 
 
Arguably, that demolition is now taking place through the normalisation of precarious work, 
alongside increased income inequalities and a decline in democratisation.  
 
While others (like Frederich Hayek and Roger Douglas) argued that the market could self-
correct so as to avoid this threat,51  Polanyi considered that assumption flawed. 52  Instead, 
markets need regulation through a political process, or re-embedding in our complex society. 
Labour markets require special care; indeed, we might best understand collective bargaining 
as an effective and reflexive form of labour market regulation (adaptable to social and 
economic conditions),53 which has the advantage of instantiating deeply held values in our 
constitution of democracy, freedom and dignity.54  
 
Every period of market building which lacked social embedding would, according to Polanyi’s 
analysis, induce a countermovement which would offer new systems of protection compatible 
 
48 Karl Polanyi The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (2nd ed, Beacon 
Press, Boston (Mass), 2001). 
49 At 75. 
50 At 76. 
51 See Friedrich A Von Hayek “Economics and Knowledge” (1937) 4(13) Economica 33; and Frederich A 
Hayek The Road to Serfdom (Dymocks, Sydney, 1944), discussed in Damien Cahill “Polanyi, Hayek and 
Embedded Neoliberalism” (2018) 15(7) Globalizations 977, 985–991. See also Deakin, above n 47; and Roger 
Douglas and Louise Callan Toward Prosperity (David Bateman, Auckland, 1987). 
52 Polanyi, above n 48, at 3. 
53 Compare Ralf Rogowski Reflexive Labour Law in the World Society (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013); and 
Judy Fudge “Regulating for decent work in a global economy” (2018) 43(2) NZJER10. 
54 See Ewing, above n 44, at 178; and Ruth Dukes The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law 




with the changes.55 To prevent the disruption of countermovement (which could take, for 
example, the form of what Polanyi identified as fascist, but today could be more kindly 
described as populist protest),56 it would be necessary to take pre-emptive measures to embed 
the market in social realities, so that people were protected. John Ruggie considered this was 
instantiated on the world stage as a form of “embedded liberalism”, a compromise consisting 
of “a combination of global currency regulations and domestic commitments to welfare 
capitalism”.57 More recently, it has been suggested that this compromise has (following a 
variety of reforms to international institutions) instead embedded “neo-liberalism”, whereby 
transnational global markets have been able to prevail over domestic assertion of social 
values. 58  It has even been suggested that the conditions for global markets have been 
entrenched by global constitutional structures, being a kind of “Geneva consensus” that enables 
(or even “encases”) exploitative trade and supply chain operations in products and services.59 
There are sustainability consequences in terms of environmental degradation and the failure of 
economic systems (boom/bust capitalism, short-term investments, corruption), but also 
consequences under the “social pillar” of sustainability. I have argued elsewhere,60 that it may 
be possible to map Polanyi’s three fictitious commodities (land, labour, money) onto the 
environmental, social and economic pillars recognised by the UN in the Sustainable 
Development Goals and Agenda 2030.61  
  
Arguably, a process of global marketisation, with all its profound consequences, has been 
compounded by the limitations of international, regional and domestic labour standards as they 
are currently legally framed. While it would, in my view, be wrong to tar the ILO with the 
 
55 Judy Fudge “The New Discourse of Labor Rights: From Social to Fundamental Rights” (2007) 29 Comp Lab 
L & Poly J 29 at 32–33. 
56 Polanyi, above n 48, at 245; Alan Bogg and Mark Freedland “Labour Law in the Age of Populism: Towards 
Sustainable Democratic Engagement” in Julia López López (ed) Collective Bargaining and Collective Action: 
Labour Agency and Governance in the 21st Century? (Hart, Oxford, 2018). 
57 John Ruggie “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded liberalism in the post-war 
economic order” (1982) 36(2) Intl Org 385.  
58 Compare Joo-Cheong Tham and Keith Ewing “Labour Provisions in Trade Agreements: Neoliberal regulation 
at work?” IOLR (forthcoming); Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn “Transnationalization and the Restructuring of 
Europe’s Socioeconomic Order” (1998) 28(1) International Journal of Political Economy 12; Philip G Cerny 
“Embedding Neoliberalism: The evolution of a hegemonic paradigm” (2008) 2(1) The Journal of International 
Trade and Diplomacy 1; and also Damien Cahill The End of Laissez-Faire? On the Durability of Embedded 
Neoliberalism (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014). 
59 Quinn Slobodian Globalists: The end of empire and the birth of neo-liberalism (Harvard, Cambridge (Mass), 
2018).  
60 See Tonia Novitz “Past and Future Work at the International Labour Organization: Labour as a Fictitious 
Commodity, Countermovement and Sustainability” IOLR (forthcoming) on which this part of the article is 
partially based.  




“Geneva Consensus” brush,62 there seems to be a significant problem across the world with the 
scope and content of collective labour laws. They do not seem to cover all those who actually 
work, reducing the scope for effective organisation and social solidarity. They do not enable 
those who wish to be represented by a trade union to do so, such that the notion of contractual 
“choice” becomes questionable. The ability to enhance strength by bargaining at a national 
sectoral level or across national borders is limited by labour laws. As we shall see, the right to 
strike has also come under threat, which is a prerequisite for trade unions to be effective in 
protecting the wider interests of those who are not only conventional employees but engaged 
in various forms of work. The scope of any right to strike also needs to reflect workers’ growing 
concerns with transnational as well as national dimensions of the hire of labour, alongside 
broader social and environmental issues, which it does not do at present. Altogether, there are 
a number of crucial lacunae to be addressed.  
 
III Potential Solutions  
 
Having identified how we arrived at a position of precarity, inequality and democratic deficit, 
it seems imperative that labour lawyers start to consider how to ensure that “collective begging” 
is replaced by meaningful “collective bargaining”. There seems to be growing consensus 
internationally on the few solutions selected here as imperative,63 with the proviso that this 
analysis is predominantly informed by a Commonwealth, common law perspective, and must 
remain open to further scrutiny and proposals from other countries and legal systems. 64 
Certainly, one agenda for change is as follows. 
  
 
62 Indeed, Slobodian, above n 59, makes no such suggestion at 266 and 281 juxtaposing ILO values with those 
of the international economic institutions; although a different view is taken by Guy Standing “The ILO: An 
Agency for Globalization” (2008) 39(3) Development and Change 355. 
63 See, for example, the proposals made by Gordon Anderson “A Proposal for Four Key Reforms in New 
Zealand’s Labour Law” (6 November 2017) Social Science Research Network <www.ssrn.com>, discussed by 
Richard Mitchell “Forty Years of Labour Law Scholarship in New Zealand: A Reflection on the Contribution of 
Gordon Anderson” 50(2) VUWLR 159, at 168–9, and those of Kate Andreas and Brishen Rogers Rebuilding 
Worker Voice in Today’s Economy (Roosevelt Institute, Washington, 2018). See also Alan Bogg and Tonia 
Novitz (eds) Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the Common Law World (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2014). 
64 Ronaldo Munck “The Precariat: A view from the South” (2013) 34(5) TWQ 747; see also Branko Milanovic 





A Removing “threshold exclusions” from access to collective bargaining  
 
Threshold exclusions from collective bargaining are rife in almost every country, although their 
focus varies. The most common is the threshold question of who is an “employee” or a 
“worker”, and even what is “work”? As observed above, this has been a way in which one of 
the United Kingdom gig employers, Roofoods (trading as “Deliveroo”), has successfully 
prevented an application for trade union recognition in the United Kingdom. 65  Another 
manifestation of the exercise of a “threshold” is the exclusion specifically of certain 
occupations from forms of employment law and collective labour law protections. An obvious 
example is the New Zealand “hobbit laws” which deem those engaged in the film sector not to 
be “employees” and only independent contractors. 66 It is also notable that recent proposals for 
reform would still exclude their access to industrial action.67 
 
Often those who are excluded are among the most vulnerable in the labour market. This is 
one of Mark Freedland’s paradoxes of precarity:68 the more vulnerable you are the less likely 
you are to be included, and then able to claim collective bargaining rights which would 
ameliorate that situation. Examples include “domestic workers”, who are explicitly excluded 
from seeking representation under the United States National Labour Relations Act.69 The 
questionable nature of this exclusion was arguably highlighted by ILO Convention No 189, 
but its coverage was compromised by a tough negotiating stance taken by certain member 
states (especially those in Europe),70 and more commitment is required to achieve its genuine 
implementation.71  
 
65 See Roofoods, above n 24. 
66 See Employment Relations (Film Production Work) Amendment Act 2010, discussed in Bernard Walker and 
Rupert Tipples “The Hobbit Affair: A New Frontier for Unions?” (2013) 34 Adel L Rev 65. See also Pam 
Nuttall “‘… Where the Shadows Lie’: Confusion, misunderstanding, and misinformation about workplace 
status” (2011) 36(3) NZJER 73; and Margaret Wilson “Constitutional Implications of ‘The Hobbit’ Legislation” 
(2011) 36(3) NZJER 91. 
67 See Derek Cheng “Hobbit Law Stays: Minimum standards coming for film industry, but striking will be 
illegal” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 13 June 2019). 
68 Mark Freedland “The Contract of Employment and the Paradoxes of Precarity” (13 June 2016) Social Science 
Research Network <www.ssrn.com>. 
69 See 29 USC § 152(3); and James Lin “A Greedy Institution: Domestic Workers and a Legacy of Legislative 
Exclusion” (2013) 36(3) Fordham Intl LJ 706. 
70 Tonia Novitz and Phil Syrpis “The Place of Domestic Work in Europe: An analysis of current policy on the 
light of the Council Decision authorising Member States to ratify ILO Convention No. 189” (2015) 6(2) ELLJ 
104. 
71 Adelle Blackett Everyday Transgressions: Domestic workers’ transnational challenges to international labor 




What is more promising is the wider coverage of the 2019 ILO Convention No 190 on Violence 
and Harassment, which applies under art 1 not only to “workers” but “other persons in the 
world of work” and requires each Member to “respect, promote and realize” (inter alia) 
“freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining”. 
This is the more sensible approach, since for freedom of association, collective bargaining and 
the right to strike, threshold constraints arguably make no sense at all. These are internationally 
recognised human rights under art 22 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and art 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. To 
deprive people of their legal autonomy to act collectively with others for the protection of their 
interests is a violation of their fundamental civil liberties, political and socio-economic 
entitlements. So much has been recognised already by ILO supervisory bodies,72 and we need 
to see this now translated into (or initiated) in the national context. 
 
B Addressing the representation gap 
 
The representation gap is another manifestation of legal constraints on a worker’s choice to act 
collectively. This is the “longstanding gap” between those who wish to be represented by a 
trade union and those who can be, 73  which has widened considerably in recent years. 
Sometimes this can be linked to stringent legal requirements as to who counts as a worker. 
These may be the threshold exclusions to which I have just referred, such as access to “worker” 
status in the United Kingdom for trade union recognition purposes,74 or legislative exclusion 
in the New Zealand “hobbit laws”.  
 
In the United Kingdom and a number of other countries, the representation gap can also be 
attributed to the ways in which an employer’s right to property can obstruct trade union access 
to the workplace (you can only have such access if formally “recognised” in the United 
 
72 See Definitive Report - Report No 363, March 2012: Case 2888 (Poland) - Complaint date: 28-JUL-11 
(2012) ILO <www.ilo.org>; and Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations [CEACR] Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016), an 
observation on Poland 2015 regarding preparation of a draft Act which had not, as at that date, been adopted 
<www.ilo.org>. For discussion of this human rights approach, see De Stefano, above n 23.  
73 Brian Towers The Representation Gap: Change and Reform in the British and American Workplace 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997); and Edmund Heery “The Representation Gap and the Future of 
Worker Representation” (2009) 40(4) Industrial Relations Journal 324. 




Kingdom or in the process of fighting a recognition ballot, in which case it is still limited).75 
Employers can even (in a United States context) require workers to attend employer organised 
anti-union meetings, but prevent comparable union meetings on the basis of their property 
rights and managerial prerogative.76 This difficulty regarding access does not arise in the same 
way in other jurisdictions, but even then mobilising trade union representation and support 
when an employer seems hostile to union membership can be obstructed, as much culturally as 
legally. 
 
The case for a union membership default, rather than the other way around, has been made 
prominently by Mark Harcourt and Gregor Gall.77 It is important in this context to note that 
negative freedom of association (the individual choice not to belong to a trade union) cannot 
neatly be equated with the right to belong. One is a bare personal preference, while the other 
has significant implications for not only one’s own welfare but the welfare of others. In this 
sense, if we look behind a right as interests sufficient to hold others to a duty (a view notable 
espoused by Joseph Raz),78 then there is a strong case for enabling the default choice of 
representation rather than its opposite.79  
 
Questions then arise as to which union becomes the default for any putative member. Here 
there has to be some caution, especially in contexts where large representative unions can 
operate with a degree of complacency, not sufficiently representing the most vulnerable. In the 
United Kingdom, there has been tension between larger and smaller unions – the Independent 
Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB) being more effective at protecting the vulnerable gig 
workers than the larger unions like Unison and the GMB, although they both have sought to 
offer protection.80 Another even more troubling example of a clash between the larger, more 
established, National Union of Mineworkers and a minority union, representing the more 
vulnerable rock drill operators, occurred in the context of the Marikana massacre in South 
 
75 Keith Ewing and John Hendy “New Perspectives on Collective Labour Law: Trade union recognition and 
collective bargaining” (2017) 46(1) ILJ 23. 
76 Lechmere, Inc v NLRB 502 US 527 (1992); discussed by Andreas and Rogers, above n 63. 
77 Mark Harcourt and others “A Union Default: A Policy to Raise Union Membership, Promote the Freedom to 
Associate, Protect the Freedom not to Associate and Progress Union Representation” (2018) 48 ILJ 66. 
78 Joseph Raz “On the Nature of Rights” (1984) 93.370 Mind 194; and “Liberating Duties” (1989) L & Phil 3. 
79 Tonia Novitz “Are Social Rights Necessarily Collective Rights? A critical analysis of the collective 
complaints protocol to the European Social Charter” (2002) EHRLR 50–66; and Tonia Novitz “Gustafsson v 
Sweden: Negative Freedom of Association” (1997) 26 ILJ 79–87. 




Africa.81 Ideally, trade unions can operate in tandem, for example, joint trade union recognition 
which gives bargaining power. However, the obligation to belong to a union may not be most 
sensibly translated as the obligation to belong to the union, if we want to keep bottom up worker 
voice alive. Michael Ford and I have, in a United Kingdom context, seen this as a trade-off of 
efficacy based on the greater power of larger trade unions and the strength of commitment and 
self-determination in newer, more spontaneous trade union activity.82 This remains a tension 
that is unresolved in an ILO context, arguably deserving attention.83 Both are vital to avoid 
collective begging and, therefore, any operationalisation of a default will have to respond and 
seek to reconcile both objectives. 
 
C Bargaining beyond the workplace nationally and transnationally 
 
The shift from sectoral to enterprise-level bargaining is widely recognised to have led to a 
decline in effective collective bargaining and, with this, a reduction in worker share of 
income.84 The reasons are perhaps self-evident. There can be a lack of knowledge and know-
how at the level of the individual workplace, whereas sectoral bargaining enables support from 
a larger number of workers who may also have experience with negotiation and dispute. 
Andreas and Rogers have considered that the problems posed by bargaining in a progressively 
“fissured” workplace have become ever more acute as each bargaining unit becomes smaller 
and more vulnerable to employer control.85  The solidarity and stronger bargaining power 
inherent in sectoral bargaining secures far superior minimum pay and terms and conditions in 
any given sector, which then can be improved upon by employers at the enterprise level which 
can afford to pay more to attract labour. Moreover, sectoral bargaining may also have beneficial 
 
81 See Temebka Ngcukaitobi “Strike Law, Structural Violence and Inequality in the Platinum Hills of Marikana” 
(2013) 34 ILJ 836; and Gavin Hartford “The Mining Industry Strike Wave: What are the Causes and What are 
the Solutions” (10 October 2012) GroundUp <groundup.org.za>. See also Bob Hepple, Rochelle Le Roux and 
Silvana Sciarra (eds), Laws against Strikes: The South African experience in an international and comparative 
perspective (Juta Jenwyn, Cape Town, 2016). 
82 Ford and Novitz, above n 25. 
83 ILO preference for “free” as opposed to powerful unions is, for example, criticised by Teri L Caraway 
“Freedom of association: Battering ram or Trojan horse?” (2006) 13(2) RIPE 210. For a more recent analysis, 
which advocates attention to bottom-up worker collective resistance, see Clair Mummé “Rights, Freedoms, 
Law, Labour, and Industrial Voluntarism: Some Comments” (2 November 2019) Legal Form <legalform.blog>. 
84 Andrea Garnero, Stephan Kampelmann and François Rycx “Minimum Wage Systems and Earnings 
Inequalities: Does institutional diversity matter?” (2015) 21(2) EJIR 115 found that higher collective bargaining 
(including sectoral bargaining) coverage was robustly correlated with lower income inequality. See also Lydia 
Hayes 8 Good Reasons Why Adult Social Care Needs Sectoral Collective Bargaining (Institute of Employment 
Rights, Liverpool, 2017). 




effects on employer conduct, encouraging them to become more competitive, not by wage 
undercutting, but “through enhanced productivity and investment in skills or innovation”.86  
 
These factors seem to have led to the New Zealand settlement for care and support workers in 
2017, 87  and indeed to proposals for re-introduction of sectoral bargaining in the United 
Kingdom in the Labour Party election manifestos of 2017 and 2019.88  While there is no 
immediate prospect that these policies will now be implemented in the United Kingdom, it will 
be interesting to see how the current Coalition Government in New Zealand responds to the 
consultation process regarding sectoral fair pay agreements which closed on 27 November 
2019.89  
 
More than this, as global capital operates transnationally, effective collective bargaining may 
need to occur for workers across national borders, whether sectorially, or with respect to a 
particular multinational enterprise (MNE). In response to the limitations of unilaterally adopted 
corporate codes of conduct, Global Union Federations (GUFs), which represent certain 
industrial and service sectors, have started to bargain directly with MNEs, leading to the 
adoption from 1994 onwards of International Framework Agreements (IFAs), now often 
termed Global Framework Agreements (GFAs).90  
 
These agreements were, early on, described as “a key trade union tool for addressing the growth 
of corporate power”.91 It has been estimated that, of the 113 IFAs concluded by 2012, coverage 
extended to at least 65,000 MNEs with more than 850,000 subsidiaries.92 The defining features 
of IFAs have been said to be their global reach (through MNE subsidiaries and sometimes also 
supply chains), the role of a GUF in negotiation and as a signatory, and reference to ILO core 
 
86 Lydia Hayes and Tonia Novitz Trade Unions and Economic Inequality (CLASS/IER, London, 2014) at 18. 
87 Care and Support Workers (Pay Equity) Settlement Agreement (1 July 2017); and for media comment: Isaac 
Davidson and Claire Trevett “Government announces historic pay equity deal for care workers” The New 
Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 18 April 2017). 
88 Labour Party election manifesto for 2017 For the Many, Not the Few (Labour Party, London, 2017) and for 
2019 It’s Time for Real Change (Labour Party, London, 2019) <labour.org.uk>. 
89 See Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment “Fair Pay Agreements” (16 January 2020) MBIE 
<mbie.gov.nz>. 
90 The current database for all transnational company agreements (compiled by the ILO and European 
Commission) is available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=978&langId=en>.   
91 This was a UK Trade Union Congress statement, cited by Keith Ewing “International Regulation of the 
Global Economy – The role of trade unions” in Brian Bercusson and Cynthia Estlund (eds) Regulating Labour 
in the Wake of Globalisation: New challenges, new institutions (Oxford, Hart, 2008) at 205. 
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labour standards and other instruments, including protection of freedom of association and the 
right to strike.93  
 
While usually not understood to be legally enforceable, IFAs (or GFAs) standardly include 
procedures for their implementation in each workplace and sometimes through works councils 
operating at a transnational level. In this sense, it has been argued that they operate in a manner 
akin to the extra-legal collective bargaining as it used to occur in post-World War II Britain 
(identified by Otto Kahn-Freund as “collective laissez-faire”, having practical regulatory 
impact, the efficacy of which is still dependent on legal props recognising trade union 
freedoms).94  
 
Reingard Zimmer has recently identified in her research the potential for these agreements to 
entail collaboration not only between GUFs and MNEs, but also between governments, 
national-level trade unions and employers and even interested civil society NGOs. She further 
identifies experiments with enforceable agreements, citing the Indonesian Freedom of 
Association Protocol and the Bangladesh Accord.95 We have yet to see such wide-ranging 
signatories or enforcement clauses in agreements with genuinely global reach, but such 
regulatory experiments do suggest that this could be possible and it is likely that the outcomes 
of such transnational collective bargaining could be more efficacious as a result.  
 
D Providing meaningful protection of the right to strike 
 
The right to strike is the most powerful and effective way of redressing the almost invariable 
imbalance of bargaining power between employer and employee, which otherwise makes a 
fiction of freedom of choice in the context of work.96 The scope of legitimate industrial action 
 
93 For a collation of these identifying characteristics, see Nikolaus Hammer “International Framework 
Agreements: Global industrial relations between rights and bargaining” (2005) 11(4) Transfer 511; Owen E 
Herrnstadt “Are International Framework Agreements a path to corporate social responsibility?” (2007) 10 U Pa 
J Bus & Emp L 187; and Lone Riisgaard “International Framework Agreements: A New Model for Securing 
Workers Rights?” (2005) 44(4) Indus Rel 707. 
94 Tonia Novitz “Exploring Multi-level Collective Bargaining: Transnational legal frameworks that promote 
worker agency” in Julia López López (ed) Collective Bargaining and Collective Action: Labour Agency and 
Governance in the 21st Century? (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2019), at 140–142. 
95 Reingard Zimmer “International Framework Agreements: New Developments through better Implementation 
on the basis of an analysis of the Bangladesh Accord and the Indonesian Freedom of Association Protocol”  
IOLR (forthcoming). 
96 For a classic explanation of these dynamics, see Otto Kahn-Freund and Bob Hepple Laws Against Strikes: 




has been progressively restricted in many domestic jurisdictions.97 At the international level, 
the connection between a right to strike and collective bargaining, established by the ILO 
Committee of Experts by virtue of ILO Convention No 87, was powerfully opposed in 2012 
by the ILO employers’ group, which staged a dramatic walkout from the Conference 
Committee on the Application of Standards. Indeed, it was an excellent demonstration of the 
potent effect of a withdrawal of labour.98 Since then, an apparent accommodation has been 
reached and ILO Director-General Guy Ryder has reported that the 2012 dispute over the 
source and content of the right to strike has been resolved.99 Nevertheless, other sources within 
the ILO have expressed concern that employer representatives are still mounting a challenge 
through, for example, the new Standards Review Mechanism.100 
 
This dispute over the very existence of a right to strike seems peculiar when one considers the 
explicit protection of this right under Art 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 1966, which also states that it is understood to be compliant with ILO 
Convention No 87. It is also odd, given that the CFA (a tripartite supervisory entity which 
makes its decisions unanimously) has also found that the right to strike is “an intrinsic corollary 
to the right to organise protected by Convention No 87”,101 a view to which the employers’ 
group must be understood to have been committed previously.  
 
The employers’ argument has little obvious legal merit, but instead follows from the 
(considerable) political pressure that the employers’ group can bring to bear under the tripartite 
structure of the ILO in a post-Cold War era.102 What is probably most worrying is that this 
unmeritorious claim hovering in the background places the workers’ group and government 
 
Novitz International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), at 
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International Law (Hart, Oxford, 2020). 
97 See, for an overview, Bernd Waas (ed) The Right to Strike: A Comparative View (Kluwer Law International, 
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98 See Report of the CCAS, ILC Record of Proceedings (2012) 19/Part I/13–19; also Claire La Hovary 
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99 See Report of the Director General: ILO Future of Work Centenary Initiative, above n 5, at [78]. 
100 Claire La Hovary “The ILO’s Employers’ Group and the Right to Strike” (2016) 22(3) Transfer 401, at 404; 
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219. 
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representatives on the defensive, such that they are not making the obvious case for further 
enhancement of the scope of a right to strike under modern conditions. Instead, the ILO could 
be considering how to adjust international labour standards to take account of contemporary 
concerns, whether these be concerned with climate change or global supply chains.  
 
For example, the “golden formula” in s 244 of the United Kingdom Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 does not allow for engagement in any industrial action, 
other than for certain specific listed purposes in a dispute with one’s immediate employer. 
Secondary action taken in sympathy with workers of a related employer, or in relation to 
concerns regarding one’s employer’s treatment of other workers in a supply chain, whether at 
home or abroad are also not permitted. Given the fissured nature of the contemporary 
workplace, this causes particular difficulties in practice.103 Moreover, this legal framework 
places a significant constraint on sectoral and transnational collective bargaining, as unions are 
left without recourse to their most obvious source of bargaining power.  
 
Moreover, under United Kingdom legislation, lawful industrial action cannot be ideologically 
motivated, such that opposition to privatisation was not regarded as sufficiently correlated to 
workers’ immediate interests as specified in the statutory provision, even though in fact this 
process did have an impact on the availability of jobs to the workers’ affected.104 This means 
that only environmental issues affecting workers immediately in the workplace could, on health 
and safety grounds, be a legitimate basis for industrial action; there is no scope to challenge 
employers’ environmental conduct due to its flow-on effects for the local community, or in 
broader climate change terms. This issue has been brought to life by the climate change strikes 
taken by schoolchildren, which workers all over the world were called to join in September 
2019.105 In the United Kingdom, the legal regime meant that unions could not officially call 
their workers out on these grounds and attending a protest would mean the risk of dismissal 
unless consent was given by the employer. At the University of Bristol, workers were told they 
could attend for half an hour.106 This was hardly effective industrial action. It is an example of 
 
103 For an outline of the problem see Alan Bogg and KD Ewing “The Implications of the RMT Case” (2014) 43 
ILJ 238. 
104 Mercury Communications v Scott-Garner [1984] ICR 37. 
105 Ruwan Subasinghe and Jeffrey Vogt “Unions must join the Global Climate Strike to avert a climate 
catastrophe” (5 September 2019) Equal Times <www.equaltimes.org>.  
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the ways in which, on issues that have contemporary relevance, workers are being deprived of 
voice.  
 
The ILO could act on these issues by revisiting its standards on freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, as well as supervisory jurisprudence on secondary action. At present, the 
CFA regards as lawful secondary or sympathy strike, but only when the primary action taken 
is lawful.107  However, it seems deeply problematic for the legality of strike action to be 
defeated by what may be the technical peculiarities of any given national legal system (such as 
the technical notice and balloting requirements in the United Kingdom) and not determined by 
the legitimacy or otherwise of its aims.108 Moreover, while the ILO has stressed in its “Just 
Transitions” of Guidelines 2015, the importance of social dialogue, including active 
participation by workers and their organisations in shaping environmental policies,109 it would 
be helpful to have confirmation that this includes effective collective bargaining supported by 




In the words of the preamble to the Treaty of Versailles 1919 signed 100 years ago, “peace can 
be established only if it is based on social justice”. This is the basis on which international 
labour law has encouraged states to promote collective bargaining and elaborated on the 
legitimate scope of a right to strike. Further, the first ILO Constitution also stated that “the 
failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other 
nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries”. This is why what 
happens in individual countries, like New Zealand, is significant for the rest of the world. If 
New Zealand in its film industry creates “workers” who are unable to strike, this sets an 
example which threatens the entitlements of labour everywhere. 
 
While, as labour lawyers, we are embedded in the structures of our own domestic systems, so 
much of the dynamics of labour relations and systems of work is global. In order not to be 
merely engaged in “collective begging” – in order to access power and effect change – there 
 
107 CFA Compilation, above n 101, at [770]. 
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needs to be scope for communication and coordination between those representing workers. I 
have argued here that trends towards precarious work, a decline in income equality and 
impoverishment of the democratic process extend beyond national boundaries. Indeed, what 
have emerged as the contemporary perils of working life are often generated by transnational 
commercial activities and have been regarded as being maintained through the operations of 
international institutions. Enabling connections between workers that challenge these national 
and transnational dynamics is the role of law, which needs to facilitate simultaneously global 
and domestic collective voice.  
 
By definition, the voice of those “at work”/ “doing work” is local – whether it is in New 
Zealand or elsewhere. Workers’ concerns have to be voiced from the bottom up. There needs 
to be space for nascent associations, spontaneous protest and courageous opposition. It is 
interesting that, in the threats to the world at work posed in the gig economy, that is precisely 
what is happening by new forms of unions who represent the notionally self-employed.110 
Arguably, that deference to local worker voice is what the ILO seeks to achieve by enabling 
each individual state to craft its own labour laws and solutions to its domestic concerns, with 
reference to overarching values and principles. The ILO also does this by supporting the 
principle of free and voluntary negotiation, while placing an onus on states to facilitate the 
collective bargaining process and protect a right to strike.111  
 
That said, the ILO also has more work to do, which is arguably now beginning. Collective 
labour laws need to be inclusive of everyone at work, so that local action can take place and 
shape agendas and norms. This means that there is a strong case for the precedent of 
inclusiveness regarding “persons in the world of work”, set by ILO Convention No 190, to be 
more broadly applied. It also entails ensuring genuine access to membership of workers’ 
organisations spontaneously generated by the needs and demands of contemporary work. 
Simultaneously, legal provisions need to enable overarching protective union structures which 
can achieve meaningful sectoral bargaining, setting minimum standards on which enterprise 
bargaining (sensitive to specific local needs) can build. There is a clear argument for legal 
facilitation of cross-border bargaining to address the reality of transnational employers, which 
means that more attention needs to be paid to legal protection of secondary or solidarity action. 
 
110 An example in the UK setting is the Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB) <iwgb.org.uk>. 




Indeed, more generally, effective worker voice entails access to a right to strike to make that 
voice heard on all the issues of contemporary concern and relevance to the conditions in which 
we now work. That said, no country, neither New Zealand nor the United Kingdom, needs to 
wait for the ILO to take action on these issues. There is scope for any domestic labour law 
system to resist the trends identified here and put an end to “collective begging” and its effects. 
Indeed, that need is now urgent.  
